1
On arrival in Fu'an 福安 City, I called a taxi, gave the driver the address of a local Catholic church and asked him to take me there. It was an open Catholic church, and its address had been given to me in Hong Kong. The driver replied: "No Catholic church there." I was surprised, having thought that most locals would at least be familiar with the shape of a church and therefore know its general location. I then asked the taxi driver to take me to a Catholic church close to the first address I had requested. The taxi driver thought for a while then took me to a majestic Catholic church in the city. Inside the church I met a nun and asked her how I could find a specific priest, giving her the name. She looked at me strangely before answering, "Are you looking for the open church?" Having realized I had made a mistake, I apologized and left the church, which did not look to me at all like an underground Catholic church. I came to realize later that an open church does exist at the specific location I told the taxi driver. However, the building was surrounded and hidden from view by shops, and as a result most locals were unaware there was a Catholic church in the city centre. It seemed very odd that an underground church should be so well known in a mainland Chinese city, raising the question: did the local people not know that the church was an "illegal" religious building?
Another thought-provoking experience during my 2007 fieldwork occurred when I attempted to find an underground Catholic church in Luojiang 羅江 county. Prior to the trip, I had been under the impression that an underground church in the county would be similar to many of the local buildings, in order not to stand out. Instead, I found a lofty church built on a hillside. Many Catholics were praying and working inside and outside the church, and next to the church was the local bishop's office. On the left of the bishop's office, a modern multi-purpose hall was under construction. This was an underground church, but visible for all to see. More questions were raised: how was it possible that so-called "illegal" priests were able to take part in their religious activities as freely and openly as those in the "legal" open church? Why were the clergy from the underground church able to work so openly in the bishop's office and why had the government not acted against them?
The case of the Mindong diocese is a good reminder to researchers that it is unwise to make sweeping conclusions about the patterns of church-state relations, because they vary from region to region and diocese to diocese. What researchers should do is to identify major patterns from different dioceses, building models that are useful to understand similar patterns of church-state relations among dioceses.
The Mindong diocese case also shows the importance of fieldwork, which reveals the difference between the church described in papers and reports and the church in reality.
One simply cannot explain why the underground Catholic church in Mindong can freely organize religious activities, if the underground church is considered as "illegal" according to the law and religious policies of China. Researching the Catholic church in China through papers, books and news articles alone, one could conclude that the power of the state was all-consuming, and thereby neglect the reality on the ground: that church members can act as agents who resist the government's policies and shape the patterns of church-state relations. This paper examines church-state relations in contemporary China from the perspective of state and society relations, seeking to identify the salient pattern of church-state relations in Mindong diocese and the social factors that contribute to its formation. In the following, I provide a historical and contemporary account of Mindong diocese, and explicate the Mindong model of church-state relations. I then explain the key factors contributing to the formation of the Mindong model. In conclusion, I discuss the implications of this church-state model in advancing religious freedom in Chinese society.
Data and Methods
This is a qualitative research project utilizing fieldwork to collect data. The reason for using this approach is that the study of the Catholic church in China continues to be very sensitive. Fieldwork allows the researcher to conduct research on various Catholic dioceses in a flexible way, by meeting and interviewing priests and the laity from both the open and underground churches.
The research subject of this paper, the Catholic church of Mindong diocese, is one of the four diocese in my on-going research project on the Catholic Church in mainland China. The other three dioceses include Wenzhou 溫州 diocese in Zhejiang province, Cangzhou 滄州 diocese in Hebei province and Fengxiang 鳳翔 diocese in Shaanxi province.
Geographically, these four diocese are located in the southern, eastern, northern and western parts of China respectively, and the church-state patterns are unique to each one. Catholics, and has a bishop, 45 priests, 88 nuns and 400 lay catechists. The open church has less than 10,000 Catholics, with an official patriotic bishop, not recognized by the pope, leading about five priests in the diocese.
The essential characteristics of the Mindong model can be described as follows: -the underground church is stronger than the open church, and their priests take the lead in the religious affairs of the diocese; -recognized by the government, the open church has legal status, however, the church is weak and somewhat neglected by the local government; 2 Charbonnier 2008, 517. -the underground and open churches compete and yet cooperate; -although the underground church is considered "illegal," the priests are able to negotiate with the local government to seek compromises; -The local government allows the underground church to celebrate mass and organize religious activities. The buildings of the underground church are legally registered. This is done via a group of Catholic laity who are members of the management committee of the church. The management committee is the registered owner, not the clergy. In legal terms, the status of the priests who perform religious rituals in the church is still considered "illegal," but the local government is tolerant. In this kind of ambiguous situation the underground church is thriving.
Church and State Relations in Mindong Diocese
Compared to other Catholic dioceses in China, Mindong diocese is unique in its high level Whether the open or underground churches obtain legitimacy is highly dependent on these two conditions. However, the Vatican is not able to fully influence the political stance of the clergy in China, many of whom have their own interpretation of political reality. In The conditions of study for these young men were poor, and they often had to go into hiding because the government constantly searched for and arrested them.
In 1984, the underground church invited a underground bishop from Tianshui 天水 diocese in Gansu province to consecrate a bishop and to ordain three priests, using the special power granted to the underground bishop by the pope. The name of the new bishop was Xie Shiguang 謝仕光, and the priests were Zhu Ruci 朱如慈, Guo Xijing 郭希景 and Liu Guangpin 劉光品. 
The mediating role of the Vatican
The Vatican is another source of influence on church-state relations in Mindong diocese. The pope's influence works through two channels: firstly, the Catholic faith and canon law, and secondly, papal directives issued to the Catholic church in China on particular subjects. The "mediating role" of the Vatican referred to here is indirect rather than direct.
One of the key issues affecting relations between the Catholic church and the Chinese government is the status of the CCPA. In the political context of mainland China, the CCPA is a government-controlled organization aimed at promoting "the principle of independence" 獨立自主 and encouraging Catholics "to take the management of churches in their own hands" 自辦教會 (hereafter "the principle of independence"). To put this slogan in the Chinese context, it means that the Catholic church in China should cut ties with the Vatican and the pope, and on its own elect and appoint bishops without regard to the pope ("self-election and self-consecration" 自選自聖 hereafter). However, these two principles are in conflict with the Catholic faith and canon law. It is stated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church: "This is the sole Church of Christ, which in the Creed we profess to be one, holy, catholic and apostolic" (Paragraph 3, Part One). 5 In this profession, the two key words "one" and "apostolic" affirm the position of the pope. The Code of Canon Law also explicates the Catholic hierarchy and the position of pope in it (Article 331, Volume 2). 6 It is stated that those who "consecrates someone a bishop without a pontifical mandate and the person who receives the consecration from him incur a latae sententiae excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See" (Article 1382, Volume 6). 6 The line is quoted as follows: "The bishop of the Roman Church, in whom continues the office given by the Lord uniquely to Peter, the first of the Apostles, and to be transmitted to his successors, is the head of the college of bishops, the Vicar of Christ, and the pastor of the universal Church on earth. By virtue of his office he possesses supreme, full, immediate, and universal ordinary power in the Church, which he is always able to exercise freely." Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2003b. 7 Ibid. 8 Lam 1997, 22-23, 126-128, 172-176. key aspect of the Catholic faith. Since the CCPA denied the position of the pope, it is against the Catholic church and Catholics should not follow what it says. It stresses that "self-selection and self-consecration" without the approval of the pope is considered illegitimate, and those who conduct or accept the consecration would be subject to "latae By affirming the Catholic faith and authority of the pope, the underground church has been granted legitimacy by the Vatican. The Catholic faith and canon law provide strong impetus to resist the arguments of the government position. In my fieldwork, the interviewees of the underground church talked about their dialogue with the government officials. One member of the senior clergy said that he was asked to receive education on law and ordinance in prison. In class, he insisted that the Catholic church has its own traditions that the government should respect. He recalled a conversation with government officials in which he said: "The government has certain demands (on certain) matters, but if these demands conflict with the doctrine, teachings and canon law of the church, we will not follow them." 10 Another senior clergy member recalled a similar dialogue in a meeting in which government officials demanded that "citizens are obliged to obey the law", implying that priests are also citizens and therefore they should not support the underground church, which is against the law. The priests replied: "There are two ways to follow the law. We do not deny the principle of law in society.
But we are also Catholics. If the law of society is in conflict with our faith and our conscience, we are obliged to obey the law passively. If the government disagrees, they could arrest us. We will take it."
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The conversation above shows that the reasons given for resisting the government are based on faith and the priests' loyalty to canon law, from which they have developed their own understanding of the responsibilities of a citizen, such as: to obey the law actively (zhudong shoufa 主動守法) and to obey the law passively (beidong shoufa 被動守法). In regard to any laws that do not violate the Catholic faith and canon law, the clergy are obliged to obey them. As for those laws that conflict with the Catholic faith and canon law, the priests are not obliged to obey. It shows that the underground priests have developed their own understanding of citizenship and the idea of civil disobedience from the Catholic faith and canon law.
In Mindong diocese, secretive ordination has become an effective way of increasing the numbers of priests. The underground church began to take students into a seminary in the 1980s. During that time, many students received only primary education before they entered the seminary. The seminary lacked of resources and teachers, and the students often had to flee arrest while receiving their theological education. Notwithstanding, the first and second batch of students were ordained as priests after three years. In this way, the underground church could produce a group of faithful Catholic priests in a short period of time.
Secretive ordination was also an effective way to increase manpower when the government arrested and imprisoned priests. In 1984, Bishop Xie Shiguang and Father Liu Guangpin were arrested when the government issued another crackdown on the underground church. The leaders of the underground church consulted all the priests in a special meeting and resolved to consecrate Father Huang Shoucheng 黃守誠 as bishop of the diocese, so that he could lead the underground church. In 1985, the underground church asked Liu Shuhe 劉樹和 from Yixian 易縣 diocese in Hebei Province to initiate the consecration. Later, the newly consecrated Bishop Huang Shoucheng ordained three more priests in order to replace those imprisoned by the government. During that time, there was a slogan in the underground church: "(The government) arrests one, (we) ordain two." The practice of secretive ordination was instrumental in producing clergy for the underground church.
"The Eight-point Directive on Dealing with China" is another important document strengthening the underground church. There were many meetings arranged between the underground clergy and government officials during the period 1988 to 1992. During these meetings, municipal, district and county government officials tried to persuade the clergy to accept "the principle of independence," and to support the CCPA on its policy of "self-election and self-consecration of bishops". 12 The priests held firmly that they could not accept it, and their arguments were largely based on the "Eight- priests who were attending a regular meeting at the bishop's office at Luojiang, including the bishop, the diocesan chancellor, the procurator, and members in the board of diocesan consultors and finance committee. The charge against the underground church was organizing "illegal activities." This is the often-quoted "event of 27 July" in Mindong diocese. The arrest of underground clergy was widely reported by international media.
14 The period of dialogue covers the years 1988 to 1992. In December 1988, the public security bureau sent a group of six officials to meet with the underground clergy: this was the beginning of dialogue. Government officials from other departments also began to take part in the dialogue. In March 1989, eight government officials from the department of religious affairs, united front work department and the public security bureau in Ningde and
Fu'an met with the priests again. The third meeting was held in Ningde in August 1989, and was attended by municipal-, district-and county-level government officials. In these talks, the government officials repeated their demands: that the underground church had to accept "the principle of independence", the leadership of the Chinese Bishops Conference, and support the "self-selection and self-consecration" of bishops. The priests stood firm in their refusal to accept the demands. In sum, the government officials and the priests simply reiterated their own positions at the meetings, and the result of dialogue was minimal.
After the "event of 27 July," the government officials continued to talk to the clergy in prison, trying to persuade them to submit to the CCPA, but their efforts yielded no result.
All the priests were released after one and a half years. The final effort of the government officials to converse with the priests was at a "seminar" in Fu'an City in April 1992. The government sent more than 20 officials to attend the seminar, including high officials of the department of religious affairs in Fujian Province and officials from department of religious affairs, united front work department and the public security bureau at the local level. The underground church sent 19 priests to take part in the seminar. However, the dialogue was still unable to resolve the conflict between "the principle of independence" and the principle of "papal primacy." After the seminar, the local government organized a free tour of the open Catholic churches in Shanghai and Beijing, hoping that this would help change the minds of the priests. In the end, the tour was not successful.
It is noteworthy that the underground clergy had the chance to express their views before government officials during the period of dialogue. Their message was that it was not their intention to oppose the government but rather to hold their faith. They were willing to support the government in matters which did not violate the Catholic doctrines and canon law. They would not comply with the government if the matters contradicted the doctrine and law. This is the meaning of zhudong shoufa (to obey the law actively) and beidong shoufa (to obey the law passively). Thereafter, the clergy did act in support of the work of the local government. For example, whenever there was a natural disaster, the clergy would launch a campaign for donations in their parishes and deliver the money to the local government. 15 The dialogue between the government and the underground clergy yielded positive results in this respect, which changed the attitude of the government.
The period of compromise began in 1992 and continues until the present. The officials of the local government knew that they could never persuade the underground priests, and decided to look at new ways of handling the problem. I call this the "management"
approach. The local government officials stated that they would allow the priests to run their religious activities freely, subject to the condition that they comply with certain rules. Among these early rules, first, the priests could not organize religious activities outside Ningde city; second, they should not talk about the differences between the open and underground churches; and third, they should not say anything against the government.
Because these rules did not conflict with their faith, the priests responded positively. The local government added other rules in the years that followed.
As described above, the local government officials attempted to force the underground clergy to comply with their demands, using persuasion and imprisonment among other methods. When they tried in vain to coerce the underground clergy, they had only a handful of options, including banning the underground church and putting the clergy in jail, or accepting the existence of the underground church yet weakening their influence in the region. With regard to the first option, the local government did try this and was proven ineffective. On the one hand, the underground church had its own way of increasing the number of clergy and opposing the government by leading 70,000 lay Catholics. On the other hand, the government had to face international pressure on the charge of violating human rights. The second option was more realistic. The three rules imposed by the government officials stated above shows that they attempted to weaken the influence of the underground church in three different aspects: the boundary of activities, the competition between the open and underground church, and the criticism of the underground clergy towards government. The rules themselves reflected that the local government had changed its attitude in dealing with the "problem" of the underground church.
The year 1994 was a milestone in regards to church-state relations in Mindong diocese. The central government issued a new ordinance named "Regulation on the Administration of Sites for Religious Activities" that year. All religious organizations had to register with the government the sites where they conducted religious activities, and the organizations themselves were responsible for the management of these religious sites.
According to the ordinance, the registered religious sites enjoyed a legal status and the protection of the government.
The deputy director of the department of religious affairs in Fujian named Chen Cheng 陳誠 made an unusual offer to the underground priests: the underground churches were allowed to register as legal religious sites. However, the registration was to be carried out in the name of the lay-member management committee of each church, as underground priests did not have legal status. In doing so, all the underground church buildings could become legal religious sites. As for the religious activities conducted by the underground priests, the local government officials tolerated them with "one eye open, and one eye shut." Based on this understanding, all the underground churches in Mindong were registered after 1994. Since then, the priests have celebrated mass and organized religious activities as "openly" Then why did the underground clergy follow the government officials' suggestion and undertake registration? The interviewee had the following answers: they were able to choose this kind of church-state relations because they possessed certain conditions, including a team of leadership in Mindong diocese, a trusting relationship among the clergy and strong solidarity. This enabled them to negotiate with the government. Furthermore, they needed to develop the church, and hiding is not a good strategy. He used the following line to describe their strategy of interaction with the government and managing the church: "dashi bufan, xiaoshi buduan 大事不犯, 小事不斷," meaning that they will not do things that violate the law, and they will make unceasing efforts in developing the church. He concluded that this has been the key factor making the Mindong model of church-state relations a success.
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The case of Mindong diocese is unique compared with the other three dioceses in my research project. In Cangzhou and Wenzhou dioceses, the local governments simply 
Conclusion and Discussion
The case of Mindong diocese shows that the underground church has been resisting the able to maintain social stability in the region.
The crux of the Mindong model is that the underground priests have been willing to engage in dialogue with local government officials. This has changed the attitude and behavior of the government officials in managing the "problem" of religion, bringing to the underground church a wider space for development and a higher level of religious freedom for the broader Catholic community. I call this church-state model a "negotiated resistance," which has the following meanings: first, the power relations of church-state interaction in Mindong diocese lie with the local government and the underground church.
The role of the open church is comparatively insignificant. Second, the attitude of the local government has changed from suppression to management. But it is still a means of social control. Third, the underground church resists the control of the government and seeks organizational autonomy. The underground clergy negotiate with government officials.
They stress that the church will not compromise in matters violating their faith, including the organizational integrity of the church. However, they are willing to support the government in matters that do not contravene their faith. Fourth, the local government adopts the method of management in exchange for cooperation from the underground church, which is significant in maintaining social stability in the local region.
The Mindong model merits further discussion in the study of church-state relations in contemporary China. The first issue is the pragmatism of the local government in Mindong.
The local government in Mindong has adopted its own method for managing religious affairs, which is largely inconsistent with the religious policies issued by the central government. How does the central government respond to the behavior of the local government officials, assuming that it is well informed about the deviation? I was told by an interviewee that the deputy director of the religious bureau, Chen Cheng, reported on Mindong's methods of management to a higher level government body, suggesting that officials of other dioceses could learn from Mindong. If this is true, that means the central government knew about the policy deviation, but allowed local government officials some flexibility on the matter. The case of Mindong diocese suggests that local government officials are prepared to compromise through negotiation. In the existing literature of church-state relations, some researchers have examined the behavior of government in regards to religious policy, laws and ordinance. The problem of this approach is that they equate papers with behavior, neglecting to observe that government officials are also social actors who, through their actions, determine social and political reality. However, this kind of religious freedom is fragile and limited because it is due to government officials' selective exercise of power and tolerance, rather than the rights stipulated by the law. One can imagine that if the conditions change, for example if the central government demands that religious policy be strictly implemented, or if new personnel ae appointed in the local government who may not tolerate deviation, then the religious freedoms enjoy presently may rapidly contract. In the long run, the priests should strive for human rights and the rule of law, which provide a solid foundation for religious freedom. However, the legal system in China lacks independence because it always serves the will of government officials. The prospect of religious freedom is also dependent on a mature environment in which the rule of law over arbitrary decisions is a value and norm in society.
